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Title: Cabelte Restructuring by OxyCapital 
This case study describes OxyCapital’s intervention in Cabelte’s operational and 
financial restructuring. Despite Cabelte’s strong debt burden, OxyCapital believed that 
the Group’s financial difficulties were temporary and that it had growth potential if the 
said restructuring would be implemented. Hence, while striving for an operational 
turnaround, OxyCapital managed to reach an agreement among not only the several banks 
but also the Group’s shareholder for the financial restructuring. The transaction included 
the acquisition of a majority stake on the Group’s share capital and of a significant part 
of Cabelte’s bank debt by OxyCapital’s Corporate Restructuring Fund. 
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Cabelte restructuring by OxyCapital 
August 7th, 2012 was the day of the closing of the call option agreement between 
Cabelte’s shareholder and the Corporate Restructuring Fund (CRF)1 managed by 
OxyCapital. After six months of hard work analyzing potential opportunities that would 
fit the Fund’s investment policy, everything was finally ready for an important step of the 
first closing of this first-time fund.  
OxyCapital’s associate Joe2, knew that there was still a lot of work to do. First, the 
twenty-one banks involved in the transaction would have to agree on the financial 
restructuring plan. Following this, the operational turnaround would have to be absolutely 
successful in order to generate enough cash flow to repay the €166M necessary to ensure 
the recovery of the Fund’s investment.  
But at 5 p.m. the telephone rang and the news arrived: the shareholder had cancelled 
the meeting. “It seems that Cabelte was able to get a €3M funding”, Joe explained to the 
team. 
Cabelte  
Founded in 1938, Cabelte is a Portuguese cable manufacturer, leader in the national 
market with consolidated sales of €237M and an accounting EBITDA of €16M in 2011. 
At that time, Cabelte Group was operating three plants (Arcozelo and Ribeirão in Portugal 
and Pamplona in Spain) where it manufactured low, medium and high voltage cables 
(representing approximately 69% of sales), cables for the automotive industry 
(approximately 18% of sales) and telecommunication cables (the remaining 13%). The 
holding company (Atlanticables) was entirely held by a single shareholder and Cabelte 
Holding held the four main operational units: Cabelte Cabos Elétricos (100%), Cabelte 
                                                 
1 See Exhibit 1 for the context of the set-up of CRF and its investment policy. 
2 Name has been changed for the sake of confidentiality. See Exhibit 2 for short biographies. 
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Incasa (100%), Cabelauto (50.6%)3 and Cabelte Metals (100%). (See Exhibit 3 for 
Cabelte’s organizational structure). 
The cable industry 
Cable manufacturers are part of an international and fragmented industry. Prior to the 
economic crisis, the largest players – such as General Cable, Nexans and Prysmian – 
invested in new capacity in an attempt to attain a global scale to face the strong bargaining 
power of suppliers of raw materials and the entrance of low cost country players in the 
developed markets. The main components of cables are commodities (aluminum and 
copper) whose prices are defined in the international markets. Hence, long-term contracts 
are generally indexed to the price of raw materials such that the final client supports any 
volatility involved4. (See Exhibit 4 for data on the LME spot prices of copper and 
aluminum).  
Despite the strong competition, the growth perspectives for the industry are positive. 
Firstly, population growth in the emerging markets is expected to drive an increase in 
consumption of energy and telecommunications and thus, create the necessity for large 
investments in electrification and communication networks – for instance, Brazil is 
expected to invest approximately €12.4bn5 until 2020 in transmission lines6. Furthermore, 
the rise of the renewable energy will result in a need for large investments in both 
distribution and transmission networks to serve solar and wind farms. Finally, despite the 
slowdown of investment in the developed countries, these countries will need to invest in 
the maintenance of existent lines. In fact, it is estimated that 83% of the transmission lines 
in Europe will reach their lifetime of 40 years between 2010 and 20147. 
The investment opportunity 
The deterioration of Cabelte’s activity started in 2009 with the economic crisis. In 
2010, similarly to the other players in the industry, the Group was able to slightly recover 
its sales, but at the expense of a lower margin. (See Exhibit 5 for Cabelte’s historical 
consolidated financial statements and Exhibit 6 for a summary of the historical financials 
                                                 
3 Cabelauto is a joint venture with Somitomo, a Japanese conglomerate, which holds 49.4% of the company. 
4 Cabelte sales are indexed to the London Metals Exchange (LME). 
5 The equivalent for R$30bn using the exchange rate at December, 31st 2011.  
6 Source: Ministério de Minas e Energia, Empresa de Pesquisa Energética. 2011. “Plano Decenal de 
Expansão de Energia 2020”. 
7 Source: McKinsey & Company data (March 2012). 
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of selected players). In 2011, the contraction of the European demand and the reduction 
of the large utilities’ investment programs resulted in a 12.1% reduction of the sales 
volume from 62kton in 2010 to 55kton in 2011. The Group was able to profit from a 
higher average LME price of the metals and thus, consolidated sales decreased only 2.7% 
from €244M in 2010 to €237M in 2011. Regardless, the gross margin shrank from 25.1% 
in 2010 to 23.2% in 2011, mainly due to price pressures in both Portugal and Spain, a 
consequence of the recession felt in both countries. Furthermore, Cabelte entered the 
United Kingdom market, which implied an aggressive price policy, and interrupted its 
sales to Libya, as a result of the civil war, where the Group had historically managed to 
capture higher margins. 
In order to face the recessive demand environment in Europe, the board hired Mr. 
Mário Pais de Sousa8 as an external consultant who would be supported by two audit and 
consultancy firms to create a strategic turnaround plan for Cabelte. The result was Project 
1/15/15: a unified company with a 15% EBITDA margin in 2015. The strategy’s three 
pillars were severe cost-cutting, the optimization of raw material purchases and a focus 
on the products and markets with the highest value. As a consequence, it forecasted 
€12.5M savings in 2013, revenues of €247M (a 16% increase from the management 
projection for 2012 sales) and EBITDA of €27M (compared to €4M expected at the end 
of 2012). Even by assuming a strong operational performance, the business plan pointed 
out €10.4M of cash needs in 2013. It was in this context that the major creditor presented 
the opportunity to OxyCapital. 
Investment rationale 
When analyzing Cabelte, OxyCapital saw a deteriorated activity and €182M of net 
debt at the end of 2011, which corresponded to 11.3x the reported EBITDA on the same 
year. Thus, the team recognized the need for an urgent operational and financial 
restructuring. But was it a good target for the CRF? Was it a viable business? Was it 
enough for an above hurdle return? 
Despite being very conscious about the associated risks, OxyCapital decided to go 
ahead with the transaction because of the Group’s stable revenue generation and presence 
                                                 
8 See Exhibit 2 for short biographies. 
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in developed European markets, its growth potential through exports and the potential to 
attain higher margins after the planned operational restructuring. 
Revenue generation was stable due to a recurrent order book from a solid client base. 
Cabelte’s main clients were European utilities in Portugal (such as EDP and PT), Spain 
(such as Iberdrola and Endesa) and other countries and in 2012, eight of the ten largest 
clients had recurrent annual contracts. Also, the Group’s small dimension in an 
international industry enables closer relations with clients and greater flexibility, 
adjusting production to clients’ needs, without relaxing the recognized quality of its 
products9.  
Additionally, Cabelte had been making an effort to position itself in the markets that 
are expected to drive the expected growth within the industry. In 2010, 65% of Cabelte’s 
sales were in the Iberian market, 18% in the rest of Europe and 17% in the rest of the 
world but by November 2012, the Iberian market represented only 55% of Cabelte’s sales 
whereas the rest of Europe represented 21% and the rest of the world 24%. Lastly, 
opportunities for consolidation were identified.  
In sum, OxyCapital believed in Cabelte’s growth potential but knew that the urgent 
operational and financial restructurings must be both simultaneous as well as 
complementary. For the process to start, the shareholder must give the Fund the 
irrevocable option to enter into the Group’s share capital and acquire the credits. 
However, on the day that the agreement was to be signed, Cabelte managed to raise 
another €3M of financing, which was considered the liquidity buffer needed to continue 
operating independently and the meeting was cancelled. 
The troubled 2nd Semester of 2012 
After the cancelled closing meeting, Mr. Pais de Sousa was nominated CEO of 
Cabelte and started to implement the planned operational restructuring. However, the lack 
of short-term financing led to a deterioration of the Group’s financial situation, including 
several registered factory stoppages due to the lack of raw materials, €10M in missed 
orders and several overdue payments to key suppliers. Thus, the commercial risk rocketed 
and banks considered that the credit risk increased as well. In this period, the Group 
                                                 
9 In order to supply European utilities, Cabelte products were certified. A certification process takes, on 
average, two years, reducing the probability of new entrants. 
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suffered the cancelation of a factoring facility valued at €23M and of several credit 
insurance contracts, which made suppliers started to demand advanced cash payments of 
the raw materials purchases, worsening the working capital problem. 
Consolidated sales plummeted 30% from €237M in 2011 to €165M in November 
2012, explained not only by a lower quantity sold (39kton compared to 55kton in 2011) 
but also by a decrease of the average price per ton. The gross margin decreased from 23% 
in 2011 to 21% in November 2012. Also, Cabelte’s total debt in November 2012 was of 
€195M, of which €177M was bank debt. In spite of that, the Group was able to reduce 
SG&A costs on 17% and staff costs on 13%, the first visible consequences of the 
operational restructuring.  
In sum, even with the start of the operational restructuring, the working capital 
problem led Cabelte to register a negative €9M EBITDA in 2012 and €199M in bank debt 
spread amongst twenty-one banks. (See Exhibit 7 for the distribution of Cabelte’s debt 
among banks and companies). The urgent need for an intervention was finally clear. 
Negotiating with the shareholder 
On December, 7th 2012, a call option agreement with the shareholder was finally 
signed, which gave the Fund the option to acquire 75.5% of Atlanticables’ share capital 
and credits - in exchange for 1€ and the release of the shareholder personal guarantees 
over the credits – and the shareholder was also given the possibility to stay as non-
executive president of the board.  
Since the cancellation of the agreement in August, OxyCapital had been working 
closely with Mr. Pais de Sousa and believed that the management team would have a 
crucial role for the success of the transaction. Thus, it should also have an important 
participation on the Group’s share capital in order to ensure that interests were aligned, 
provided that the Fund would stay as the majority shareholder in order to be able to lead 
the restructuring. Thus, 24.5% of the share capital was transferred to the management 
team, such that the team would have the same percentage of ownership as the shareholder 
and the CRF would hold 51%. (See Exhibit 8a and 8b for the shareholders structure 
before and after the call option is exercised). 
The final structure will be adjusted after the total amortization of the credits and if the 
company is considered to be stabilized. Therefore, the previous shareholder was given 
the option to repurchase up to one third of Atlanticables’ share capital that can only be 
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exercised if the said conditions are verified. If so, the CRF will transfer to the management 
team the number of shares that would equalize the percentage of ownership of each of the 
three parties. (See Exhibit 8c for the shareholders structure after the repurchase option is 
exercised). 
However, the CRF’s call option could only be exercised if the Fund managed to sign 
an agreement with the banks involved to acquire the €71M of credits of the operational 
companies and if a sufficient liquidity buffer, which would allow the operations to restart 
working at their normal pace, was achieved. Therefore, OxyCapital negotiated with 
Cabelte’s major creditors €10M in cash to repay what was overdue to suppliers, to 
purchase raw materials and to finance the one-week lead time estimated at the time. 
Additionally, the said banks approved €8M in factoring facilities and export advances as 
well as €8M of bank guarantees to restore working capital. 
Joe explains “If the deal would have been closed previously, the commercial risk 
would have been lower and banks would probably not have needed to provide the working 
capital financing. When a firm is in such a critical situation, time definitely matters. There 
was no need for Cabelte to reach a treasury rupture”.  
Planning the financial restructuring 
After the agreement with the shareholder was signed, OxyCapital’s team needed to 
prepare the financial restructuring while the management team focused on improving the 
Group’s operations. So, on January 2013, with Mr. Pais de Sousa at the helm of the 
operational restructuring, the team was dedicated to the analysis of the impacts of an in-
court negotiation against an out-of court one. Since OxyCapital believed in Cabelte’s 
value as a going-concern, its team particularly considered the possibility of pursuing an 
SRP (Special Revitalization Procedure)10. The team found that although an SRP would 
allow a 4-year grace period for both bank debt and for account payables (resulting in a 
positive impact of €19M), the risk of not being able to finance short-term needs was 
considered too high: for instance, under this scenario the commercial funding lines might 
be cut off (resulting in a negative impact ranging from €4M to €23M), suppliers may 
                                                 
10 A legal framework launched by the Ministry of the Economy in the context of the external assistance 
program which allowed a debtor that is considered temporarily insolvent to continue operating while 
negotiating with its lenders. The goal of this legal framework was to set clear rules and therefore to faster 
the decision making process. 
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execute the guarantees (resulting in a negative impact of €1M) or require advanced 
payments (resulting in a negative impact of €5M) and credit insurance contracts to 
suppliers could be cut off (resulting in a negative impact of €5M). At the end of the month, 
the team met with the major creditors to present the aforementioned conclusions. Based 
on the identified risks, they decided against the SRP and instead chose to create a plan 
that would allow Cabelte to continue satisfying its financial responsibilities to lenders that 
did not participate in the CRF. 
Following a 4 hour-long meeting, the banks alerted that only €1M of the €10M of new 
money injected into the Group in December was leftover, forcing OxyCapital to realize 
that it would need to intervene as the Group’s treasury was near rupture and the risk of 
bankruptcy was too high. The team would need to support the CEO in the implementation 
of the operational restructuring. 
Three analysts moving to Arcozelo 
On February 11th, Joe and two analysts moved to Cabelte’s headquarters in Arcozelo. 
Joe describes the arrival: “it was a financial and productive chaos”. Due to the operational 
restructuring, the former CFO and approximately twenty production senior officers had 
been dismissed. “At least there was a commercial director who could work on the order 
book”, Joe says. There were almost no control mechanisms: productive planning was not 
reliable (weekly actual sales were usually 20% to 40% below plan), there was no control 
over wastes and scrap, no planning for the purchase of raw materials and no control of 
the order book. Furthermore, liquidity was managed on a daily basis and there was no 
control over collections and credit risk. 
Moreover, liquidity was an enormous problem: due to the cancellation of the credit 
insurance contracts and the use of the €10M of new money, there was no available cash 
and thus, there was no room for any mismatch between the plan and reality. The only 
lifebelts were the factoring facilities and the export advances that had not yet been used 
at that point. It was clear that gauging the value of the Group’s sales as well as of the 
quantity of raw materials was both an utter and urgent necessity in order to understand 
which guarantees the team should ask for.  
Joe says: “It needed to work like a Swiss watch”. For Cabelte to be able to use the 
factoring facilities, the invoices needed to arrive not later than noon-time, so that the bank 
could approve them internally and transfer the money to suppliers before 2 p.m., in order 
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to be received on the next morning. This was critical as suppliers would load their trucks 
only after receiving the money and only then would the raw materials arrive on time to 
ensure production for the next day. Joe continues “you fell asleep without being sure that 
the mill would have raw materials to work the day after tomorrow and if you would have 
cash to pay the salaries of the 694 workers”. 
The team lived in Arcozelo for three cold, rainy, dark and stressful months, creating 
planning and control mechanisms and ensuring the day-to-day liquidity management. Joe 
and the analysts worked as an interim CFO, acting as the right hand to the CEO. 
Negotiating with banks 
At the same time, OxyCapital was responsible for leading the financial restructuring. 
At this point in time, Cabelte could be considered insolvent since it was not able to satisfy 
its responsibilities: the year of 2012 ended with a negative €9M EBITDA and the 
forecasted debt servicing for 2013 was €16M. However, OxyCapital’s rationale in 
entering this transaction was its belief that this was a temporary situation and that the 
Group had growth potential that would be achieved with the team’s commitment to the 
operational restructuring plan. 
The team had already decided against an in-court restructuring due to the associated 
risks and the need for an urgent solution. Although it would be a faster solution, it would 
be harder to reach a unanimous agreement amongst all creditors. Each creditor must 
firstly recognize that the value of the firm as a going concern is higher than its liquidation 
value and then accept the value distribution proposal.  
In order to prove that the value of the firm as a going concern was higher than the 
liquidation one, the team calculated the recovery rate that would be achieved by the banks 
in the event of liquidation, by splitting the value of the assets by each claim in accordance 
to seniority rules (see Exhibit 9 for the calculation of the recovery rates in different 
scenarios). It was forecasted that in the base scenario, the debtholders would recover 17% 
of their claims in liquidation compared to 48% in the going concern alternative. 
Furthermore, the fact that the acquisition of credits would make the Fund Cabelte’s major 
creditor represented a strong incentive for OxyCapital’s team to maximize the value of 
the Group. With this, in the case of accepting the going concern alternative, banks could 
count on the commitment of the private equity firm to the success of the operational 
restructuring and, thus, on the materialization of the forecasted recovery rates. 
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In order to ensure that the twenty-one banks would timely and unanimously accept 
the value-distribution proposal, the team designed a structure that grouped claimers and 
resembled an in-court negotiation. The goal was to mitigate the probability that an 
individual claimer would have an incentive to hold out for more favorable treatment.  
After an iterative negotiation process, two more banks joined the Fund and an 
agreement among all of the other banks that would ensure the minimization of the debt 
burden in the first years of operations and the new money necessary to finance this period 
was reached. 
Financial restructuring 
The agreement among the banks that participated in the Fund was signed on March, 
26th 2013, expressing the unanimous acceptance of the proposed terms. (See Exhibit 10 
for a summary of the approved debt restructuring and Exhibit 11 for the sources and uses 
of the transaction).  
The CRF acquired the €71M of credits of the operational companies (Cabelte Cabos 
Elétricos, Cabelte Incasa, Cabelauto and Cabelte Metals) of the six banks that decided to 
participate in the Fund, excluding the commercial debt (factoring facilities, export 
advances, etc). The credits were acquired at their nominal value but were restructured: 
there were no mandatory amortizations and the interest payments were capitalized. These 
credits were to be remunerated at EURIBOR 6M + 7.5%. 
The €38M of commercial debt of the operational companies (factoring, confirming, 
export advances, etc.) were maintained in order to continue financing Cabelte’s 
operations and were to be remunerated at an average of EURIBOR 3M + 3%. 
The €65M of credits of the holding companies were maintained but restructured: there 
were no mandatory amortizations and the interest payments were capitalized. The loans 
were to be remunerated at EURIBOR 3M + 2.5%.  
The €14M of credits of the operational companies from banks that decided not to 
participate in the Fund were restructured such that the loans were to be progressively 
amortized in five years (12.5% in 2013 and 2014 and 25% in each of the following years) 
and remunerated at EURIBOR 12M + 3%. 
The €13M of new money raised by the Group in 2012 were also restructured: the loans 
were to have a bullet amortization in 10-years’ time and to be remunerated at EURIBOR 
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12M + 4.75%. The possibility to have early amortization provisions, if at pari passu with 
the amortization of the debt acquired by the Fund, was also agreed upon. 
The repayment priority was defined as follows: firstly, the operational credit lines and 
the credits of the banks that did not participate in the Fund should be amortized; secondly, 
it should be paid the interest on the credits acquired by the Fund; thirdly, the CRF’s credits 
should be amortized; and only then, the interest and principal of the credits of the holding 
companies should be paid. 
In order to minimize the downside for the Fund in the case of bankruptcy (an event 
that was likely if the out-of-court restructuring were to fail), the entity acquiring the share 
capital was purposely a different one from the one acquiring the credits. In a liquidation 
scenario, shareholder loans are considered subordinated to all other credits: the value of 
the assets would be first distributed to the privileged creditors (employees, tax authority 
and secured loans), then to the common creditors (in the proportion of their claims) and 
only after to the subordinated creditors. Hence, the 75.5% of Atlanticables’ share capital 
was acquired by Coax (an investment vehicle) while the €71M of credits were acquired 
by the CRF, for the Fund to be positioned as common creditor. 
Finally, for the call option of Atlanticable’s share capital and credits to be exercised, 
the Fund needed to ensure the short-term financing needed to support the startup of 
Cabelte’s operations. Although €8M of factoring facilities and export advances and €8M 
of bank guarantees had already been raised in December 2012, the conclusion of the Due 
Diligence revealed that the lead time of the factories was three weeks instead of the one 
week estimated by the management team, implying an extra cash need of €4M. 
Furthermore, the Due Diligence team found orders that were not budgeted implying a 
€10M new line of export advances and a new line to fix the LME price with an €11M 
plafond. These lines were grouped within the operational credits and were contracted 
under the same conditions. 
No longer on the precipice 
On March, 26th 2013, the CRF exercised the call option, becoming Cabelte’s majority 
shareholder and acquiring the aforementioned credits. Two months later, in May 2013, a 
new CFO was hired and the liquidity problem was stabilized. Although there was still a 
lot of work to do, Cabelte was no longer on the precipice. 
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OxyCapital’s Managing Partner says: “What was done was absolutely extraordinary. 
If the team had not intervened, a viable company with an enormous growth potential 
would be liquidated and 694 people would have lost their jobs.” 
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Exhibit 1     The Corporate Restructuring Fund  
In April 2011, the Portuguese economy entered a financial assistance program and 
registered a -2.8% GDP contraction and a 14% unemployment rate. The recessive 
economic environment severely affected the Portuguese non-financial corporations 
whose revenues and EBITDA decreased 9% and 25%, respectively, in 2012. 
Furthermore, the Portuguese non-financial corporations were extremely indebted. 
In 2012, the debt of the non-financial companies reached €698B, which represented 
411% of the country’s GDP and 87% of the Portuguese corporations had net debt 
superior to 5x EBITDA. Also, 29% of the non-financial corporations had negative 
equity values, meaning that they were exclusively financed by external capital, and 
41% reached EBITDA levels inferior to its interest payments. 
For the Portuguese economy to recover in a sustainable way, a deleveraging process 
would need to start. It was in this context that Mr. Miguel Lucas decided to raise a 
restructuring fund and to create OxyCapital along with other partners. The main 
purpose of the Corporate Restructuring Fund was to lead the financial and operational 
restructuring of companies that were struggling due to financial difficulties but that 
could still grow, namely through an increase of exports or through consolidation. Banks 
would commit capital in exchange of units of participation in the Fund that would 
acquire the credits of the selected companies. The CRF first closed in August 2012 with 
an initial capital of €360M. 
Sources: Bank of Portugal. December 2011 and October 2012. “Statistical Reports”.; OxyCapital; Central de 
Balanços do Banco de Portugal. November 2013. “Análise sectorial das sociedades não financeiras em Portugal 
2012/2013”. 
Exhibit 2     Short biographies 
Miguel Lucas   Mr. Lucas is the Managing Partner and co-founder of OxyCapital. 
Mr. Lucas was a Managing Partner of McKinsey & Company and is member of the 
strategic council of Universidade Católica, where he completed a degree in 
Management and Administration. Mr. Lucas holds an MBA from Harvard Business 
School. 
Mário Pais de Sousa   Mr. Pais de Sousa was a consultant for the restructuring of 
Cabelte before being nominated CEO. Prior to his first role in Cabelte, Mr. Pais de 
Sousa was the CEO of Grupo Vista Alegre Atlantis, had been the vice-president of 
Robert Bosch as well as the CEO of Vulcano-Termodomésticos. 
Joe Before joining OxyCapital as Associate, Joe was an Analyst at a top 
management consultancy firm. He holds a Masters in Finance from Nova SBE. 
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Exhibit 5     Cabelte’s historical consolidated financial statements (M€) 
 
Source: Annual reports and OxyCapital 
2010 2011 2012
Revenues 244 237 172
Costs of goods sold (185) (177) (134)
Selling, general and administrative expenses (23) (20) (18)
Staff costs (23) (21) (21)
Other revenues and expenses 3 (2) (8)
EBITDA 16 16 (9)
Depreciation and amortization (5) (4) (6)
EBIT 11 12 (14)
Interest and similar income and expenses (10) (12) (16)
Profit Before Taxes 1 (0) (31)
Income tax for the period (1) (1) (1)
Net Profit 0 (1) (31)
2011 2012
ASSETS
Tangible assets 45 42
Goodwill 82 100
Other non-current assets 16 13
Non-current assets 143 155
Inventory 23 19
Account receivables 32 28
Other current assets 14 9
Cash and cash equivalents 4 1
Current assets 73 56
Total ASSETS 217 211
OWNERS' EQUITY
Capital 2 2
Share premium 17 17
Reserves 1 1
Retained earnings (19) (37)
Revaluation surpluses 11 18
Other changes in owner's equity (1) 1
Profit for the period (1) (25)
Minority interests 11 4
Total owners equity 19 (19)
LIABILITIES
Provisions 1 3
Long-term loans 84 126
Other non-current liabilities 9 8
Total non-current liabilities 94 137
Account payables 36 30
Short-term loans 49 43
Other current liabilities 19 21
Total current liabilities 103 93
Total LIABILITIES 197 230
Total OWNERS' EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 217 211
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Source: Bloomberg  
Exhibit 7     Cabelte’s debt in January 2013 (€M) 
 
1Despite not being part of the Group, Wall Space is a real estate company fully held by the shareholder, to which 











Cabelte Cabelauto Incasa Metals Win Brain Iberoptics Total
A 11 17 6 23 45 0 102
B 3 4 12 36 0 0 43
C 3 2 6 0 12
D 6 1 7
E 6 6
F 4 2 0 5
G 3 1 4
H 2 2
I 2 2
J 2 0 2
K 1 0 1 2
L 2 2
M 1 0 2
N 1 0 2
O 1 0 1
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Exhibit 9     Debtholders recovery rates in liquidation and as a going concern (€M) 
 
 
Liquidation scenarios were built based on the discount applied to the value of the assets in case of a fire-sale; Going 
concern scenarios were built based on the level of implementation of the operational measures that were part of the 






Conservative Base Optimistic Conservative Base Optimistic
Value of the assets 89 98 112 75 117 153
Bankruptcy costs 24 24 24 0 0 0
Factoring contracts 40 40 40 40 40 40
EV to distribute amongst creditors 25 34 48 35 77 113
Bank debt 162 162 162 162 162 162
Account payables 35 35 35 0 0 0
Total debt 197 197 197 162 162 162
Debtholders recovery rate (%) 13% 17% 24% 22% 48% 70%
Exhibit 8a 
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After the repurchase option is exercised 
 
Confidential   17 













Cabelte Incasa  
100% 
Cabelauto  
Cabelte Metals  
50.6% 
Atlanticables 







The debt of the holding companies was maintained but 
restructured such that there were no mandatory 
amortizations nor interest payments. The repayment 
starts when the debt of the operational companies is 
completely amortized. 
Operational Companies 
The debt of the banks in the fund was acquired but 
restructured such that there were no mandatory 
amortizations nor interest payments. 
The debt of the banks that did not participate in the fund 
was restructured: it should be amortized in 5 years. 
The commercial debt (factoring facilities, export 
advances, etc.) was maintained. 
Credits acquired by the CRF 
 
Restructuring and transaction costs 
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Debt of the holding companies 
New money 
Commercial lines 
Banks that did not participate in the CRF 
 













Total     235 
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1. In which way did OxyCapital add value? 
2. Discuss the rationale for a bank to participate in a restructuring fund. 
3. Would it be possible for the banks to arrange a successful restructuring 
without participating in a fund? 
4. Why are there some banks that still not participate in restructuring funds? 
5. Compare the shareholder situation if the company would be liquidated and 
if the restructuring will be well succeeded.  
6. What are the limitations of the agreed restructuring? How do they affect 












Cabelte restructuring by OxyCapital 
 
 
Cabelte should be interpreted as an extremely indebted Group where financial 
problems contaminated operations and led a viable company almost to insolvency, 
namely due to a liquidity shortage. It should be reinforced that in such a case both the 
operational and financial restructurings must be simultaneous, such that the operational 
turnaround is not conditioned by liquidity pressures and the company generates enough 
cash flow to grow and to face the new calendar of amortizations. However, it is important 
to recognize that negotiating with creditors at the same time as restructuring operations 
requires an extreme effort and coordination. OxyCapital intervention relaxed this burden, 
minimizing management distraction. 
1. In which way did OxyCapital add value? 
OxyCapital’s intervention maximized the perceived value of Cabelte as a going 
concern and minimized the probability that the operational restructuring would fail. By 
acquiring the credits, the CRF became the Group’s largest creditor, which has aligned the 
Fund’s interests to Cabelte’s value maximization and by leading the financial 
restructuring, OxyCapital allowed the management team to focus on the operational 
turnaround. Furthermore, the private equity firm continuously supported the management 
team on its challenging task. At the end of the day, the belief in Cabelte’s value as a going 
concern and the structure of the financial restructuring proposal made possible a 
unanimous agreement among the twenty-one banks and the shareholder.  
It is also important to notice that OxyCapital’s intervention allowed both the 
operational and the financial restructuring to be simultaneous and thus to complement 
each other. As such, it was possible to overcome the extreme liquidity shortage the Group 
was facing and to profit from all the benefits associated with the restructurings. 
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2. Discuss the rationale for a bank to participate in a restructuring fund. 
For a bank, entering into a restructuring fund implies the transformation of its credits 
into units of participation in the fund. An equity participation is junior to the credits and 
is not secured by real guarantees. Furthermore, such an operation implies that the bank 
abdicates having a direct control over the company’s cash flow distribution since its stake 
in the company was transferred to an external entity. The participation in restructuring 
funds is also associated with the need to pay management and success fees.  
As such, a bank would enter a restructuring fund if it believes it is maximizing the 
recovery probability of the loans to companies that would be bankrupt if not restructured. 
A financial restructuring allows a reduction of the debt burden and, thus, the generated 
cash flow can be reinvested in the company, allowing it to recover. Notice that when a 
company is facing severe difficulties, if a complete restructuring process is not 
implemented, the most probable outcome is for the company to start failing the principal 
payments on its loans. If so, a bank would have non-performing loans in its balance sheet 
and would need to register a loan-loss provision on the full loan amount. Since provisions 
directly affect the annual net income, the Common Tier I capital11 would also be directly 
affected. Therefore, participating in a restructuring fund avoids severe capital 
consumptions in order to maintain the Common Tier I ratio at the required 4.5% of risk-
weighted assets under the Basel III regulatory framework12. 
Having a fund acquiring the credits and leading the restructuring process means that 
the process will be managed by an independent and professional team and maximizes the 
probability of reaching a unanimous agreement among creditors and consequently of the 
success of the financial restructuring. Moreover, as the majority shareholder and 
simultaneous the largest creditor with a residual claim, the fund is able to align the 
incentives of the management team to value creation, which also maximizes the 
probability of success of the operational restructuring. 
Finally, the fact that the company’s operations are maintained allows the bank to 
continue generating income from the commissions and interests charged when financing 
                                                 
11 Common Tier I Capital includes common shares, stock surpluses, retained earnings, accumulated other 
comprehensive income and other disclosed reserves and common shares from subsidiaries. 
12 The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision of the Bank of International Settlements. December 2011. 
“Basel III: a global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”.  
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the said operations. In the case of Cabelte, there have been €38M of commercial lines that 
were maintained and were to be remunerated at an average of Euribor 3M + 3%.    
3. Would it be possible for the banks to arrange a successful restructuring without 
participating in a fund? 
Firstly, the immense difficulty on reaching a unanimous agreement among several 
banks should be considered. Without an external independent party leading the process, 
each bank has always incentives to reject the agreement, since it is very difficult to find 
solutions that would benefit each one equally. 
Furthermore, even in the event the banks would agree on hiring a new management 
team to lead the operational restructuring, it would be extremely difficult to ensure that 
the team would be striving for the interest of each bank equally. Without holding an equity 
participation, creditors would be unable to align interests by transferring a percentage of 
the company’s shares to the management team. 
Lastly, even in the extreme scenario where all banks agree on the restructuring terms 
and are able to hire an independent management team, a bank would not be able to reach 
a deal with the company’s shareholder. In a transaction with a restructuring fund, the 
share capital is acquired for a symbolic value but in exchange for the release by the fund 
of the shareholders’ personal guarantees over the acquired debt. However, for a bank, 
compensating a shareholder would create a moral hazard problem. Indeed, if a bank itself 
would release the shareholders’ personnel guarantees on its credits, every shareholder 
would have the incentive to over indebt his company and the role of guarantees in credit 
risk mitigation would simply disappear. In contrast, a fund is an independent entity with 
a higher bargaining power. 
4. Why are there some banks that still not participate in restructuring funds? 
Some banks consider the capital consumption increase when a loan starts not to 
perform not to be high enough vis-à-vis the fees they would need to pay for participating 
in a restructuring fund, as well as the loss of seniority, guarantees and of control over the 
distribution of the company’s cash flows. 
In fact, one should notice that the magnitude of the capital consumption increase 
would depend on the specific characteristics of the loan before it starts not to perform. 
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For instance, banks with more conservative provision models would be less affected by 
the need to register a provision on the full amount of the loan.  
Despite the aforementioned benefits of participating in restructuring funds, these 
entities are commonly thought to be used to clean banks’ balance sheets. If the fund is 
used to rescue non-viable firms, just for the sake of avoiding the recognition of provisions 
in a given year, the units of participation would be devalued over time, requiring the banks 
to recognize provisions in a certain point in time. If so, the problem was only delayed, not 
solved. Some banks point that private equity firms would have the incentive to approve 
investments regardless the viability of the companies since the general partner receives 
management fees on assets under management. Therefore, the participation on 
restructuring funds is an opened debate, expectant for successful examples.  
5. Compare the shareholder situation if the company would be liquidated and if the 
restructuring will be well succeeded.  
In liquidation, the shareholder has the residual claim and his stake has no value. Also, 
his personal assets would be appropriated since the personal guarantees would be 
executed. On the other hand, the restructuring proposal enables the shareholder to 
maintain 24.5% of the holding company, his personal guarantees are cancelled and he 
stays as non-executive director. 
At a first glance, the shareholder benefits immensely from the transaction. However, 
one should notice that his equity participation is worthless, since the current business plan 
gives an enterprise value lower than the total value of the debt. In that sense, the release 
of the personal guarantees are considered to compensate the lower recovery rates that 
banks would attain and the almost 700 families that would be affected by the 
unemployment problem in a liquidation scenario. 
6. What are the limitations of the agreed restructuring? How do they affect 
Cabelte’s current activity? 
Due the liquidity problem Cabelte was facing, the transaction structure involved the 
maintenance of the €38M of commercial lines and €29M of working capital financing 
lines, remunerated at an average of Euribor 3M + 3%. In addition, the €14M of debt to 
the banks that did not participate in the CRF was agreed to be progressively amortized in 
the first five years following the transaction and to be remunerated at Euribor 12M + 3%. 
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Therefore, even after the transaction, Cabelte’s treasury is still pressured by large annual 
interest payments on the debt. 
Another limitation of the financial restructuring is its incapacity of dealing with 
international credit insurance companies. Cabelte’s troubled period led to the cancelation 
of several credit insurance contracts which are important sources of working capital 
financing since they are required for suppliers credits. Once a contract is lost, it takes 
approximately two years for a credit insurance company to reassess the credit quality of 
the Group. Hence, Cabelte’s growth and international expansion is conditioned by the 
access to this source of working capital financing, creating more pressure in liquidity 
management. 
What happened? 
Since CRF’s entrance in Cabelte in the first semester of 2013, the Group’s operational 
performance has been improving. After the negative €9M EBITDA in 2012, Cabelte 
registered sales of €220M and an EBITDA of approximately €14M in 2013. In 2014, 
despite a 13% decrease in the average annual price of the raw materials, the Group expects 
to achieve €230M of sales and an EBITDA of approximately €15M. Although the number 
of workers decreased 13% since the beginning of the restructuring process, production is 
expected to increase 44% from 70kton in 2012 to 101kton in 2014, which reflects 
significant productivity gains. Furthermore, the production quality has been improved, 
illustrated by the reduction of the registered average number of defects per month from 
177 in 2012 to 35 in 2014. Also, the sales to the Portuguese market represented 35% in 
2012, but only 30% in 2013 and are expected not to be higher than 20% in 2014. 
However, Cabelte is still considered very indebted with a net debt to EBITDA ratio 
of 5.7x in 2013 and 5.6x in 2014. This ratio disregards the debt to the CRF and the debt 
of the holding companies (since there are no mandatory amortizations nor interest 
payments) and includes all the debt associated with the working capital financing. 
 
